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ARGUMENT 
I. No Statute of Limitations Commences to Run Against a Party in Possession in 
an Action to Quiet Title in Real Property. 
The appellees assert that Mr. Conder admits that the present action is based on fraud 
and that, therefore, the statute of limitations governing fraud applies and bars his action 
to quiet the title to his home and residence. They argue, in the alternative, that the six 
year statute of limitations governing contractual actions acts as a bar to Mr. Conder's quiet 
title action. These arguments are baseless and lack merit,1 and they are irrelevant to the 
issue as to Mr. Conder's quiet title action. 
The appellees fail to address the fact that Mr. Conder has remained in possession 
of his home and real property since its purchase by him. In that he has been in continuous 
possession at all times relevant to this matter, maintaining the property, paying taxes and 
mortgages, no statute of limitations is applicable to bar Mr. Conder's suit. Rodgers v. 
Hansen, 580 P.2d 233, 235 (Utah 1978); see also Muktarian v. Barmbv. 63 Cal. 2d 558, 
407 P.2d 659 (Ca. 1965). The appellees also fail to discuss the fact that Mr. Conder is 
simply moving to quiet the title to his real property. Actions to quiet title in real property 
*At no time did Mr. Conder assert or claim that Mr. Hunt obtained the deed from him 
through fraudulent means, nor do appellees cite to one instance where Mr. Conder has alleged 
that Mr. Hunt used fraudulent means to obtain the deed. It is not fraudulent to use a deed as a 
mortgage substitute. A deed can be determined to be a mortgage, even though the deed is 
absolute on its face. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991); see also 
Bown v. Loveland. 678 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984). 
1 
are generally not governed by any statute of limitations. Davidsen v. Salt Lake City. 81 
P.2d 374 (Utah 1938); Restatement, Property Actions of Ejectment, Suits to Quiet Title 
and Similar Proceedings §222. In that Mr. Conder is petitioning the court to quiet the title 
to his real property of which he is in possession, no statute of limitations bars his right to 
so petition the Court. Rodgers v. Hansen. 508 P.2d 235 (Utah 1978). 
The appellees assert that "[a]ll the Conder(s) needed to do ... was to repay the 
money advanced by Hunt, plus interest at the legal rate, and they thus would be entitled 
to a reconveyance of the property as agreed". Appellees' Brief at 7. If the remedy were 
as simple as the appellees claim, Mr. Conder would have tendered the payment to Mr. 
Hunt. However, an examination into the judgment liens and encumbrances that have 
attached to the property as a result of the Defendants' interests in this property reveals that 
this remedy will do nothing more than put money in one Defendant's pocket, leaving 
claims between Defendants, and the property still encumbered requiring quiet title. These 
judgments and encumbrances far exceed the original debt to Mr. Hunt, and possibly 
exceed the fair market value on the property. 
n. Res Judicata Does Not Prevent an Unsuccessful Intervener from Suing Under 
a Separate Cause of Action. 
The appellees also argue that Mr. Conder is precluded from proceeding in this 
matter by the doctrine of res judicata. They argue that Mr. Conder moved to intervene in 
2 
the prior action (Civil No. 880907793), that his motion was denied, and that he failed to 
appeal the denial. Mr. Conder admits these facts. However, contrary to the appellees' 
argument, even if the facts in the prior action are similar to the facts in the present case, 
the similarity does not create a duty for Mr. Conder to appeal such that he is prevented 
from bringing a separate quiet title action regarding his real property. 
Mirroring his motion to affirm and joined by Mr. Hunt, Mr. VonWald argues that 
Chevenne River Sioux Tribe v. United States, 338 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 
382 U.S. 815, 15 L. Ed. 2d 62, 86 S. Ct. 34 (1965), holds that if a necessary party fails 
to appeal a court's denial of his intervention motion, res judicata applies to bar any other 
subsequent action with similar facts. The appellees contend that Cheyenne thereby 
supports their position that res judicata prevents Mr. Conder from bringing the present 
quiet title action. The appellees' argument is an inaccurate interpretation of Cheyenne. 
In Cheyenne, the 8th Circuit held that res judicata precluded the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe (the "Tribe") from bringing a separate action based on specific findings that 
the tribe's rights were represented by the government in the previous suit, the Tribe had 
agreed to the procedure and that they thereby agreed the government was capable of 
representing them. Cheyenne. 338 F.2d 906, 909-910. No such facts were present in Mr. 
Conder's action. 
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit clarified its holding in Cheyenne in a case similar 
to the present case. In Enterprise Bank v. Magna Bank. 92 F. 3d 743 (8th Cir. Mo. 1996) 
3 
the court found that the appellees' interpretation of Cheyenne is incorrect. In Enterprise. 
Magna Bank contended that claim preclusion barred Enterprise's declaratory judgment 
action against it in that Enterprise failed to appeal the court's denial of its intervention 
motion. Magna Bank argued that Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States. 
338 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1964) supported their position that failure to appeal a denial of a 
motion to intervene barred the party from suing on the same issues in a separate action, 
although they had not been a party to the previous action. 
The 8th Circuit disagreed, and held that Cheyenne was not applicable to the facts 
of the 
Enterprise case, but only precluded an attempted intervener from re-litigating whether the 
motion for intervention should have been granted. 
Contrary to Magna fs contention, Cheyenne does not hold that the failure to 
appeal the denial of a motion to intervene as of right will always preclude 
that party from bringing a new suit that raises the same underlying claims as 
did the motion to intervene. Rather, Cheyenne holds only that failure to 
appeal the denial of a motion to intervene as of right will bar the party 
from later relitigating whether it was an indispensable party . . . 
because the legal issue decided against it in denying intervention—the 
issue of indispensability—was the precise issue it sought to litigate again 
in the independent action. Nothing in Cheyenne suggests that its holding 
was to have any broader implications. 
The facts of the present case do not fit within the limited holding of 
Cheyenne. Enterprise does not seek to relitigate whether it was an 
indispensable party to the Magna lawsuit; it does not seek to have the Magna 
judgment declared null and void. Rather, Enterprise merely seeks to litigate 
those claims that the Magna court refused to consider. Claim preclusion is 
therefore not applicable. 
4 
Enterprise. 97 F.3d at 746-747, emphasis added citing Cheyenne, 338 F. 2d at 911. 
The facts of this case also "do not fit" within Cheyenne's limited holding, and more 
closely mirror the facts in Enterprise. Mr. Conder is not suing to determine whether he 
was an indispensable party to the previous suit. Nor is Mr. Conder seeking to render 
invalid the Court's ruling. Mr. Conder, as in Enterprise, is petitioning the Court to 
consider those issues not considered in the prior suit. Res judicata is therefore not 
applicable in the present case. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment was inappropriately granted in that the appellees were not 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. No statute of limitations applies to a person in 
possession of property who is seeking to quiet the title to his real property, and, in this 
case, his home and residence for over twenty years. It is not until possession is interrupted 
or terminated that any statute of limitations begins to run. Since Mr. Conder's possession 
of the property has never been interrupted or terminated, his quiet title action is not 
affected by any "applicable" limitations statute. 
The trial court also inappropriately applied the doctrine of res judicata to a matter 
in which Mr. Conder was never a party and was not granted the opportunity to stand 
before the court and present his position. No other entity in the prior action represented 
5 
his position and his claims were never adjudicated. Contrary to the appellees' argument, 
the Eighth Circuit supports Mr. Conder's position that he is not barred by res judicata 
from proceeding in the present action. The dismissal of Mr. Conder's quiet title action 
wrongfully terminated Mr. Conder's right to have his day in court. Therefore, the trial 
court's ruling should be reversed. 
DATED this J ^ d a y of July, 1999. 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Richard C. Terry 
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